3️⃣ Institutional Non-Performance by the U.S. NCP (Oct–Dec 2025)

🟦 Official Record under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (U.S. National Contact Point – Procedural Non‑Performance)

🔹 Summary: The U.S. NCP failed to provide any formal procedural response (acceptance, rejection, or assessment) within 45 days after submission, in violation of the OECD Guidelines. This page documents the case as a clear instance of procedural abandonment and institutional non-performance.

This page documents the procedural non‑performance of the U.S. National Contact Point (NCP), which failed to issue any acceptance decision or initial assessment by 1 December 2025 (EST) in response to the Specific Instance submitted on 15 October 2025.
The following is a formal institutional record of the chronology and legal evaluation.

In OECD member countries, National Contact Points (NCPs) are expected to receive whistleblower submissions, conduct an initial assessment, and—where appropriate—facilitate mediation and remedy.

In this case, a fully structured Specific Instance (including all evidence files, legal analysis, and Annexes 0–7) was formally submitted on 15 October 2025, with the complainant explicitly requesting that the U.S. NCP provide a decision on acceptance and procedural direction by 1 December 2025, 17:00 EST.

After submission:

On 3 November 2025, the complainant sent a follow‑up (Evidence No.74), requesting confirmation of receipt and an explanation of procedural status.
In mid‑November 2025, the U.S. NCP sent an email (Evidence No.75) acknowledging receipt of the submissions and explaining the impact of the U.S. Government shutdown.

However, this communication only stated:

the fact of receipt,
and the temporary unavailability of the office due to the shutdown—

and did not include:

a formal acceptance or rejection of the Specific Instance,
any specific and reasonable justification for a rejection or deferral,
any indication regarding the initiation of the initial assessment, or the possibility, timing, or feasibility of mediation.

In other words, the U.S. NCP did not provide any of the “substantive procedural responses” required by the OECD Procedural Guidance.

As a result, after the deadline of 1 December 2025 (EST), no acceptance decision, no initial assessment, and no procedural direction had been provided.

This constitutes a clear case of procedural non‑performance and a systemic refusal to activate the OECD mechanism.

This procedural inaction represents a direct deviation from the OECD Procedural Guidance (I.C.2, II.C.3–4) and the 2021 Council Recommendation (¶16 and ¶20), and raises serious concerns regarding:

the functional capacity of the NCP,
the reliability of the OECD’s remedy mechanisms,
and whistleblower access to justice in a cross‑border context.

This pattern—formal acknowledgment only, without substantive procedural action—undermines confidence not only in the U.S. NCP but also in the institutional integrity of the OECD Guidelines system as a whole.

Accordingly, this page records the case as a dual non‑performance, involving both the Japanese and U.S. NCPs, requiring international oversight and corrective review within the OECD framework.

🧾 Terminology Usage (Definitions Applied on This Page)

On this page, the following closely related concepts are defined and used with the following distinctions:

Non-performance

→ Refers to a situation where the NCP fails to carry out mandatory procedural steps required under the OECD Procedural Guidance—such as a decision on acceptance, an initial assessment, or the provision of reasons for rejection.

Systemic refusal

→ Describes a scenario in which, despite the formal existence of an NCP office, the mechanism does not function in practice, thereby denying access to the procedure altogether through inaction.

Procedural abandonment

→ Indicates a condition where the NCP provides only formal acknowledgments (e.g., receipt confirmations) but subsequently halts all substantive decisions or procedural steps, leaving the process effectively dormant.

Throughout this page, “non-performance” is used as the primary evaluative term, while “systemic refusal” and “procedural abandonment” are employed where necessary to describe specific aspects of institutional failure.

🔷 Comparative Table: OECD Obligations vs. U.S. NCP Response

📘 OECD Provision	🗭 Expected Conduct from NCP	❌ Actual Response by U.S. NCP (Oct 15 – Dec 1, 2025)
Procedural Guidance I.C.2	Notify the parties of a decision on acceptance or initial assessment within a reasonable timeframe.	Despite the clearly stated deadline of Dec 1, 2025, 17:00 [EST], the NCP failed to provide any formal decision regarding acceptance or initial assessment.
Procedural Guidance II.C.3	Acknowledge all submissions, and if rejected, provide clear and reasonable justification.	In mid-November 2025, the NCP sent a formal acknowledgment and explanation citing the U.S. government shutdown (Evidence No.75), but no decision on acceptance or rejection, nor any concrete reasons, were provided.
Procedural Guidance II.C.4	Ensure transparency by informing the notifier of procedural progress and enabling escalation to the OECD Investment Committee when appropriate.	No explanation was provided regarding the initiation of an initial assessment or mediation timeline, leaving the status of the procedure entirely opaque and forcing the notifier to consider direct escalation to the OECD Secretariat and Investment Committee.
Council Recommendation ¶16 (2021)	Ensure whistleblowers who face retaliation have access to effective complaint and remedy mechanisms.	Despite involving cross-border retaliation and systemic institutional failure, the NCP did not initiate any substantive steps such as investigation, initial assessment, or mediation.
Council Recommendation ¶20 (2021)	Actively and constructively engage in launching remedial procedures to uphold trust in the mechanism.	Apart from a procedural acknowledgment, there was no attempt at mediation or constructive dialogue, amounting in practice to procedural abandonment.

🔷 Submission Timeline and Procedural Non-Performance by the U.S. NCP

On October 15, 2025, the whistleblower formally submitted a Specific Instance to the U.S. National Contact Point (Department of State), fully compliant in form, evidence, and legal structure. The submission concerned a cross-border case, supported by Annexes 0–7 and Evidence Nos. 00–60.

Subsequently:

On November 3, 2025, a follow-up request (Evidence No.74) was sent by the notifier, seeking acknowledgment and clarification of procedural status.
In mid-November (November 15), the U.S. NCP responded with an email (Evidence No.75) acknowledging receipt and citing office unavailability due to the U.S. government shutdown.

However, by the clearly specified deadline of Monday, December 1, 2025 at 17:00 [EST], the U.S. NCP had failed to:

Provide a formal decision on whether the Specific Instance was accepted or rejected;
Offer any clear and reasonable justification in the event of rejection or deferral;
Disclose the status or timeline for initial assessment or mediation consideration.

This absence of action constitutes a clear procedural violation under the OECD system.

1. Submission Overview

Date of Submission: October 15, 2025
Submitter: Shunsuke Kimura (named whistleblower; former Maeda Corporation employee, subsidiary of Infroneer Holdings)
Recipient: U.S. National Contact Point (U.S. Department of State, USNCP@state.gov)
Prior Notification: Advance notice sent on October 9, 2025 (Evidence No.63)
Submitted Materials (Core Components):

Structured complaint (Specific Instance main text)
Annexes 0–7 (English)

Annex 0: Procedural eligibility, jurisdiction, and substantive criteria pre-check
Annex 1: Timeline map of Evidence Nos. 00–60 and relevant stakeholders
Annex 2: Compensation model for structural redesign and individual redress
Annexes 3–4: ESG downgrade risks and implications of mediation denial
Annexes 5–7: Model case analysis, corporate documentation evidencing structural violations, written Q&A, etc.

2. Factual Basis of the NCP's Inaction

Under the OECD Procedural Guidance, all NCPs are obligated to provide substantive procedural responses—such as acknowledgment of receipt, initial assessment, acceptance decision, and mediation consideration—within a reasonable timeframe.

In this case, during the period from October 15 to December 1, 2025 [EST], the following actions were not taken:

❌ No formal decision issued on whether to accept or reject the Specific Instance
❌ No clear and reasonable justification provided in the event of presumed rejection or deferral
❌ No indication of whether initial assessment or mediation procedures had commenced or been scheduled
❌ No constructive communication regarding any path toward remedy or redress under the OECD Guidelines

In short, while a single procedural acknowledgment was issued, the U.S. NCP failed to meet its core procedural obligations, effectively undermining the protective function of the mechanism and amounting to procedural abandonment.

3. Systemic Silence Within a Multilateral Framework

⚠️ The conduct of the U.S. NCP in this case does not merely reflect “delayed communication,”
but rather represents institutional silence—a situation where a written acknowledgment is provided without any substantive procedural action.

Unlike the complete silence of the Japanese NCP, the U.S. NCP:

Sent a one-time email acknowledging receipt and citing the U.S. government shutdown, but
Failed to issue any further procedural decisions regarding initial assessment, acceptance, or mediation.

This constitutes, in practice, a deliberate decision not to activate the procedure—a form of systemic refusal.

As a result, the case qualifies as a dual non-performance by both the Japanese and U.S. NCPs, and should be formally subjected to institutional review by the OECD Secretariat and other member-state NCPs.

4. Violations of the OECD Guidelines

As indicated in the comparative table above, the U.S. NCP’s conduct constitutes four core violations:

Failure to notify acceptance/rejection within a reasonable period (Violation of I.C.2)

Between submission on October 15 and the clearly stated deadline of December 1, 17:00 [EST], no decision was communicated.

Failure to explain reasons for rejection or deferral (Violation of II.C.3)

The November email only acknowledged receipt and referenced shutdown circumstances.

No specific rationale was provided for rejection or procedural suspension.

Lack of procedural clarity, denying access to remedy mechanisms (Violation of II.C.4)

No information was shared about initial assessment, potential mediation, or escalation options to the OECD Investment Committee.

Denial of access to redress for a retaliated whistleblower (Violation of Council Recommendations ¶16 and ¶20, 2021)

Despite involving a cross-border case with documented retaliatory dismissal, the NCP failed to initiate any substantive remedial process such as investigation or mediation.

These are not mere administrative delays—they represent a systemic failure to fulfill the core purpose of the NCP mechanism, which is to enable access to remedy and redress. This is a textbook example of non-performance.

5. Legal and Normative Mapping: Applicable Frameworks and Principles

💡 Implications of the U.S. NCP’s “formal receipt + substantive silence” from October to December 2025:

The U.S. NCP received a cross-border, named submission supported by extensive evidence and Annexes
But failed to issue any acceptance decision, rejection rationale, or explanation of the possibility of assessment or mediation by the clearly stated deadline.

This conduct can be evaluated as follows:

🔍 Category	⚠️ Confirmed Issues	📜 Relevant Legal and Policy References
🌐 OECD Procedural Guidance	No formal decision on acceptance or initial assessment was issued by the deadline of December 1, 2025, 17:00 [EST], as explicitly stated by the complainant.	I.C.2: Obligation to notify parties of an initial assessment or acceptance decision within a reasonable period. II.C.3–4: Obligation to provide concrete and reasonable reasons in case of rejection and to inform parties at each procedural stage.
🌐 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises	The NCP failed to ensure a process that is fair, transparent, predictable, and effective.	Chapter VIII, Paragraph 1: Obligation to offer equitable, transparent, and effective grievance procedures.
🌐 OECD Council Recommendations (2021)	No access to effective investigation or remedy was provided to the whistleblower who suffered retaliation.	Paragraphs 16 & 20: States must ensure remedial action in retaliation cases and initiate redress mechanisms through the NCP.
🌐 UNCAC (UN Convention Against Corruption)	From the perspective of whistleblower protection, the NCP's inaction effectively denies institutional safeguards.	Article 33: States must protect whistleblowers from retaliation and guarantee access to secure and effective reporting channels.
⚖️ International Best Practices	Compared to other NCPs such as those of France, the UK, and the Netherlands, the lack of clear timelines and predictability is striking.	OECD Peer Review Reports and UNGP Principles 29–31: Remedy mechanisms must be predictable, fair, legitimate, and rights-compatible.

6. Formal Statement by the Whistleblower

❝On October 15, 2025, I submitted a Specific Instance to the U.S. NCP, in full compliance with the official OECD format and legal requirements, supported by Annexes 0–7 and an extensive body of evidence.
In mid-November, I received an email acknowledging receipt of the submission and explaining the government shutdown.
However, by December 1, 2025, no formal decision was made regarding acceptance, initial assessment, or mediation consideration.
This is not a mere delay. It constitutes procedural abandonment and systemic refusal
and must be treated as a serious case of institutional failure warranting international review—one that directly undermines the credibility of the OECD grievance mechanism itself.❞
— Shunsuke Kimura (Named Whistleblower, former employee of Maeda Corporation)

📎 Corresponding Evidence Records (Submission to U.S. NCP)

📅 Date	Entity	📄 Document / Summary	Related Evidence Page
2025/10/09	Shunsuke Kimura → U.S. NCP	Advance notification email sent to the U.S. NCP, indicating the forthcoming submission of a Specific Instance against Infroneer Holdings. The message outlined violations of the OECD Guidelines (retaliation, accounting fraud, obstruction of whistleblowing) and highlighted Japan NCP’s procedural failure, while requesting procedural cooperation.	Evidence No.63▶️
2025/10/09	U.S. NCP	The U.S. NCP replied, explaining that due to a U.S. government shutdown (furlough), only emergency and national security functions were operational, and that the NCP was temporarily inactive.	Evidence No.64▶️
2025/10/15	Shunsuke Kimura → U.S. NCP	Formal submission of a Specific Instance alleging structural violations of the OECD Guidelines by Infroneer Holdings and Maeda America Inc. (e.g., retaliatory dismissal, concealment of industrial accidents, collapse of corporate governance). The submission included annexes and evidence, and proposed a mediation framework aligned with OECD Procedural Guidance.	Evidence No.65▶️
2025/10/15	Attached Evidence	Annexes 0–7 systematically outlined: (1) procedural eligibility (Annex 0), (2) evidence No.00–60 and stakeholder mapping (Annex 1), (3) structural redesign and compensation scheme (Annex 2), (4) ESG downgrade risks and mediation refusal impact (Annexes 3–4), (5) model case framing (Annex 5), (6) corporate documents proving structural breaches (Annex 6), and (7) written Q&A hearings (Annex 7).	No.66 (Annex 0)▶️ No.67 (Annex 1)▶️ No.68 (Annex 2)▶️ No.69 (Annex 3)▶️ No.70 (Annex 4)▶️ No.71 (Annex 5)▶️ No.72 (Annex 6)▶️ No.73 (Annex 7)▶️
2025/11/03	Shunsuke Kimura → U.S. NCP	A follow-up email requesting acknowledgment of receipt and explanation of the procedural status. It reaffirmed the NCP’s duty to acknowledge under OECD Procedural Guidance and warned that continued silence would trigger escalation to the OECD Investment Committee.	Evidence No.74▶️
2025/11/15	U.S. NCP	The U.S. NCP sent an email confirming receipt of the October 9 and October 15 submissions and explaining their absence due to the U.S. government shutdown. However, this email did not provide any procedural decisions regarding acceptance, initial assessment, or potential mediation.	Evidence No.75▶️
2025/10/15–12/01	U.S. NCP	Following the receipt of the Specific Instance, and apart from the administrative note on November 15, no procedural decision (acceptance, rejection, assessment, or mediation) was communicated for 45 days. This period constitutes a record of institutional silence and non-performance.	(Institutional silence recorded as OECD non-performance)
2025/12/02	Shunsuke Kimura → U.S. NCP / OECD Secretariat / Other NCPs	A formal notice was sent to the U.S. NCP stating that no procedural decision had been issued by the December 1, 2025 [EST] deadline. This was officially characterized as non-performance and systemic refusal, citing Procedural Guidance I.C.2, II.C.3–4, 2021 Council Recommendations ¶16 & ¶20, UNCAC Article 33, and UNGP Principles 29 & 31. The case was also classified as a dual non-performance (U.S. and Japan NCPs), with simultaneous disclosure to the OECD Secretariat, Investment Division, RBC team, peer NCPs, and ESG evaluation institutions.	Evidence No.76▶️
2025/12/10	U.S. NCP →Shunsuke KimuraCC: Japan NCP	On December 10, 2025, the U.S. NCP notified that it had concluded its consideration of the Specific Instance after discussing the matter with the Japanese NCP, and formally deferred the case to Japan, stating that the issues concern a Japanese-based company and individual. This marked the U.S. NCP’s procedural withdrawal without assessment under its own mechanism.	Evidence No.79▶️
2025/12/10	Shunsuke Kimura →U.S. NCPCC: OECD Watch, OECD Secretariat	This email, sent on December 10, 2025, formally rejects the U.S. NCP’s decision to defer the case to the Japanese NCP—on the grounds that Japan had already been accused of non-performance—before any acknowledgment had been received from the Japanese NCP. It declares the U.S. NCP’s procedural inaction as a case of institutional non-performance under the OECD Guidelines and Council Recommendation, and concludes the notifier’s engagement with the U.S. NCP.	Evidence No.80▶️

Subsequent Developments: Procedural Reactivation Triggered by International Monitoring

Although the U.S. NCP’s withdrawal on December 10, 2025, constituted procedural non-performance, this action coincided with formal documentation of institutional failure submitted to the OECD Secretariat (see Evidence No.78▶️). The Secretariat formally acknowledged the allegations on the same day.

Shortly thereafter, on December 25, 2025, the Japanese NCP issued its first official acknowledgment, confirming receipt and acceptance of the Specific Instance submitted months earlier.

This sequence of events supports the interpretation that:

✅ Inter-NCP coordination, under OECD oversight pressure, ultimately prompted procedural reactivation in Japan,
even though both NCPs had previously exhibited inaction.
✅ Therefore, while the U.S. NCP failed to carry out its own obligations, its deferral—under the gaze of institutional scrutiny—nonetheless served to restore minimal functionality to the grievance mechanism.

This also demonstrates the value of external escalation and formal institutional alerts, even in the face of systemic delays.

🔷 Conclusion

The U.S. NCP formally received a cross-border Specific Instance that was submitted under the complainant’s real name, supported by detailed legal reasoning and extensive documentary evidence. Although it issued a one-time response acknowledging the government shutdown, it failed to provide any formal decision—acceptance or rejection—by the declared deadline of December 1, 2025 (EST), nor did it initiate an initial assessment or mediation process.

This is not a mere delay; rather, it constitutes a clear case of procedural non-performance and systemic refusal, fundamentally undermining the credibility of the OECD grievance mechanism.

This case demonstrates the following critical points:

Despite its institutional importance, the U.S. NCP failed to issue any formal procedural determination—either acceptance or rejection—between October 15, 2025 (submission date), and the clearly declared deadline of December 1, 2025, 17:00 [EST].
Although the NCP sent a message in mid-November (Evidence No.75) explaining its office shutdown and acknowledging receipt of the submission, this was purely administrative in nature and did not address the required procedural steps such as formal admissibility determination, initiation of the initial assessment, or mediation consideration, as stipulated in the Procedural Guidance.
As such, the U.S. NCP's inaction constitutes a denial of access to remedy and a failure of institutional duty under OECD Procedural Guidance (I.C.2, II.C.3–4), the 2021 Council Recommendations (¶16, ¶20), UNCAC Article 33, and UNGP Principles 29–31.
Accordingly, to preserve the credibility of the OECD framework, escalation to the OECD Secretariat (Investment Division, RBC Team) and institutional review by other peer NCPs (e.g., France, the Netherlands) is not only justified but essential.

🔷 Supplementary Note: Legal and International Principles (with Article References)

💡 Implications of the U.S. NCP’s “Formal Receipt + Substantive Silence” between October and December 2025:

On October 15, 2025, the U.S. NCP received a cross-border Specific Instance submitted under the complainant’s real name, accompanied by sufficient documentary evidence and structured annexes (Annex 0–7).
In its mid-November response (Evidence No.75), the U.S. NCP acknowledged:

Receipt of both the advance notice (October 9, Evidence No.63) and the formal submission (October 15, Evidence No.65);
The fact that its office was non-operational due to a government shutdown, resulting from the lapse in U.S. federal budget appropriations.

However, this communication was limited to a basic receipt acknowledgment and an explanation of temporary office closure. It did not address:

Whether the Specific Instance was accepted or rejected;
Any specific and reasonable grounds for a possible rejection or deferral;
Any explanation regarding the initiation or non-initiation of the initial assessment and mediation process.

Therefore, this situation does not constitute total silence (i.e., zero response), but rather procedural silence—a failure to fulfill the substantive procedural obligations under the OECD framework. As a result, this represents an effective denial of access to remedy.

🔷 Institutional Non-Performance by the U.S. NCP – Official Record of Non-Engagement

The Specific Instance concerning Infroneer Holdings and Maeda America Inc. was formally submitted on October 15, 2025 (see Evidence No.65). The complainant clearly requested that, by Monday, December 1, 2025 at 5:00 p.m. EST, the U.S. NCP provide a notice of acceptance, rejection, or procedural stance, in accordance with the OECD Procedural Guidance.

Subsequently:

A follow-up request was submitted on November 3, 2025 (Evidence No.74), and
The U.S. NCP responded in mid-November with an email acknowledging receipt and citing government shutdown-related office closures (Evidence No.75).

However, even after the December 1, 2025 deadline, the following were not provided:

A formal decision on whether the Specific Instance would be accepted or rejected;
Any specific and reasonable justification for a potential rejection or deferral;
Any indication of the initiation of the initial assessment or mediation process.

This was not a mere administrative oversight. It constitutes clear institutional non-performance, as defined by:

Procedural Guidance I.C.2 – Failure to issue an initial assessment or acceptance/rejection decision within a reasonable timeframe;
Procedural Guidance II.C.3 – Failure to provide specific and reasonable grounds for rejection, if applicable;
Procedural Guidance II.C.4 – Grounds for potential referral to the OECD Investment Committee due to procedural irregularities.

This submission met all necessary standards:

It was fully structured and procedurally validated (Annex 0),
It was filed under the complainant’s real name
It included extensive supporting evidence and legal documentation (Annexes 1–7 and Evidence No.00–60).

Nonetheless, no acceptance or rejection decision was issued, nor was any initial assessment provided—clearly falling short of the baseline standards expected under the OECD Procedural Guidance.

Accordingly, the notification dated December 2, 2025 (Evidence No.76) constitutes an:

Official designation of the case as a “non-performance” and “systemic refusal” by the U.S. NCP;
Formal inclusion of the case within a “dual non-performance” scenario, alongside Japan’s NCP;
Procedural request for a systemic peer review and corrective recommendation by the OECD Investment Division and RBC Unit.

This communication therefore stands as an official procedural record of institutional non-engagement and rule-based escalation under the OECD framework.

🔷 Structural Failures in the U.S. NCP’s (Non-)Response

The U.S. NCP received a submission that clearly met all procedural and substantive criteria, including:

✅ A real-name whistleblower submission;
✅ A cross-border case involving both Japan and the United States;
✅ A fully compliant structure in accordance with OECD procedural standards, validated through Annexes 0–7.

Despite this, the U.S. NCP:

❌ Failed to issue any formal decision on whether the Specific Instance would be accepted or rejected;
❌ Failed to provide any specific and reasonable explanation in the event of rejection or deferral;
❌ Failed to inform the complainant of the initiation (or non-initiation) of an initial assessment or mediation process.

The mid-November email from the U.S. NCP (Evidence No.75) confirmed:

Receipt of the submission, and
Temporary suspension of operations due to the U.S. government shutdown.

However, this communication did not fulfill any substantive procedural obligations (procedural response) required under the OECD Guidelines.

Given the U.S. government’s stated leadership in whistleblower protection and Responsible Business Conduct (RBC), the operation of its NCP cannot be viewed as a discretionary or symbolic service. Rather, it must be understood as a non-discretionary state function, requiring continuity and predictability in accordance with its treaty obligations.

By failing to provide any decision on admissibility or initiation of the assessment phase, the U.S. NCP undermined:

The whistleblower’s right to seek remedy;
The procedural credibility and predictability of the NCP framework itself;
The international trust placed in U.S.-led compliance mechanisms and ESG governance norms.

🔷 International Significance

This case serves as a symbolic and cautionary example demonstrating that procedural obligations under the OECD Guidelines and Procedural Guidance may not be fulfilled—even by major OECD member states.

The 45-day period marked by the U.S. NCP’s formal acknowledgment without any substantive determination reveals the following:

That whistleblowers may, in practice, never even receive a formal response to the most basic procedural steps—such as admissibility or the initiation of an initial assessment;
That if such passive conduct becomes normalized, it could lead to a systemic erosion of the legitimacy and reliability of NCPs worldwide;
That, therefore, a procedural review and corrective recommendations by the OECD Investment Committee and other NCPs is not only justified but urgently required.

🔷 Silence Record by the Whistleblower

The fact that the U.S. NCP failed to provide a determination on admissibility, initiate an initial assessment, or indicate any consideration of mediation within the expected timeframe (October 15 – December 1, 2025) has already been:

Fully documented through a chronological and evidence-based record (Evidence No.63–76);
Formally consolidated as an official procedural record under OECD procedures via the whistleblower’s notification on December 2, 2025 (Evidence No.76);
Categorized as a clear case of institutional disengagement and systemic refusal within the OECD framework.

This “silence” is not a matter of mere communication failure.

It is now formally recorded as evidence of procedural non-performance under the OECD system.

🔷 Final Statement by the Whistleblower

❛ Despite receiving a cross-border Specific Instance submitted under a real name, supported by complete evidence and annexes,
the U.S. NCP allowed the deadline to lapse without issuing any formal decision on admissibility or the initiation of an initial assessment.
This was not a mere administrative oversight — it constitutes a structural failure through deliberate disengagement.
Such inaction must be formally recognized as a clear violation of the core principles underpinning the OECD framework. ❛
— Shunsuke Kimura
(Original Complainant and Whistleblower of the Specific Instance submitted on October 15, 2025 / Submitter of Evidence No.63–76)